Картели в цифровой экономике

Розанова Надежда Михайловна   

Статья опубликована в журнале «Проблемы прогнозирования» (ISSN: 0868-6351 (Print), ISSN: 3034-0071 (Online)), №1 2025

RUEN
КАРТЕЛИ В ЦИФРОВОЙ ЭКОНОМИКЕ

РОЗАНОВА Надежда Михайловна, д.э.н., профессор, happyeconomics@list.ru, Московский государственный университет им. М.В. Ломоносова, Москва, Россия
ORCID: 0000-0003-3660-0625; Scopus Author ID: 57196418754

Аннотация. Анализируются формируемые в цифровой экономике механизмы координации действий участников рынка. Показывается, каким образом ценовые сигналы видоизменяются под действием цифровых картелей. Использование алгоритмического ценообразования, опора на сознательный параллелизм цифровых платформ, скрытые договоренности специалистов – таковы новые формы картелизации. Особые инструменты цифровой экономики – анализ агрегированных данных с помощью специальных программ, машинное обучение, нацеленное на выявление монопольных тенденций рынка, использование цифровых нерегулируемых контактов третьих лиц помогают поддерживать картельную дисциплину в отрасли даже без формальных переговоров и тайных договоренностей.

Ключевые слова: монопольные эффекты, цифровая экономика, картели, картелизация, алгоритмическое ценообразование.

JEL: D21; D40; D43; L13; L40

DOI: 10.47711/0868-6351-208-202-210

Статья поступила в редакцию 24.05.2024. Статья принята к публикации 09.07.2024.

Для цитирования: Н.М. Розанова. Картели в цифровой экономике // Проблемы прогнозирования. 2025. № 1 (208). С. 202-210. DOI: 10.47711/0868-6351-208-202-210

DIGITAL ECONOMY CARTELS

N.M. ROZANOVA, Doct. Sci. (Econ.), Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
ORCID: 0000-0003-3660-0625; Scopus Author ID: 57196418754

Abstract. This article analyzes action coordination methods that are formed in the digital economy and used by market players. It is shown how price cycles change under the influence of digital cartels. The new cartelization forms include algorithmic pricing, reliance on conscious parallelism of digital platforms, and hidden specialist agreements. A host of special digital economy tools, such as aggregate data analysis in specialized programs, machine-learning aimed at identifying monopolistic trends in the market, and using nonregulated digital contacts of third parties, help maintain cartel discipline in the sector even without formal negotiations and clandestine agreements.

Keywords: monopolistic effects, digital economy, cartels, cartelization, algorithmic pricing.

DOI: 10.1134/S1075700724700606

Received 24.05.2024. Accepted 09.07.2024.

For citation: N.M. Rozanova. Digital Economy Cartels // Studies on Russian Economic Development. 2025. Vol. 36. No. 1. Pp. 135–140. DOI: 10.1134/S1075700724700606

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