Картели в цифровой экономике

Розанова Надежда Михайловна   

Анализируются формируемые в цифровой экономике механизмы координации действий участников рынка. Показывается, каким образом ценовые сигналы видоизменяются под действием цифровых картелей. Использование алгоритмического ценообразования, опора на сознательный параллелизм цифровых платформ, скрытые договоренности специалистов – таковы новые формы картелизации. Особые инструменты цифровой экономики – анализ агрегированных данных с помощью специальных программ, машинное обучение, нацеленное на выявление монопольных тенденций рынка, использование цифровых нерегулируемых контактов третьих лиц помогают поддерживать картельную дисциплину в отрасли даже без формальных переговоров и тайных договоренностей.

Статья опубликована в журнале «Проблемы прогнозирования», №1 2025

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